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· Has counterterrorism policy been 
evaluated? 
 
· Is counterterrorism effective? 
 
· What are the best options for policy 
to fight terrorism? 
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Counterterrorism – 
does it work? 
Summary:  The  terrorist  threat  has  increased  in 
importance  over  the  last  decade  and  Western 
governments  have  implemented  a  multitude  of 
measures  to  address  it.    Their  numbers  and  the 
significant  financial  cost  they  involve  have, 
however,  not  been  matched  with  an  adequate 
evaluation of effectiveness. We can therefore only 
make  limited  statements  on  whether  or  not 
counterterrorism policy has been effective. Three 
conclusions  with  policy  implications  can 
nevertheless  be  drawn  from  our  analysis:  the 
dependency  on  the  local  context;  the 
ineffectiveness  of  measures  entailing  the  use  of 
force; and the need for more evaluation research 












Efforts to combat terrorism have become a priority in 
the security agenda of many countries. Undoubtedly, 
the policies, tools and instruments used have imposed 
high  costs  on  the  national  economies  of  these 
countries. In 2009, the EU is estimated to have spent 
€93.5  million  on  counterterrorism  (CT)  alone 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Comprehensive data 
on European member states’ spending, in contrast, is 
not available. Estimates for the US suggest that more 
than $1 trillion have been spent on counterterrorism 
measures in the past decade.  
Policy efforts not matched by evaluation 
The increase in spending and the number of policies 
implemented, however, has not been matched by an 
equal assessment of the effects and the effectiveness of 
these measures. There has not been a systematic effort 
or much progress in the academic field regarding the 
evaluation of the effects of counterterrorism policies.  
Only  a  small  number  of  studies  on  terrorism  and 
counterterrorism tackle the question of effectiveness 
at all.  
For  instance,  the  installation  of  camera  surveillance 
(CCTV)  has  been  advanced  in  many  countries  as  an 
instrument  to  deter  future  terrorists.  There  is, 
however,  no  systematic  evidence  on  whether  these 
systems  have  the  intended  effect  (Stutzer  and 
Zehnder, 2010). 
However, there is growing interest in learning more 
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The kaleidoscope of 
counterterrorism 
effectiveness research 
instruments.  This  claim  has  been  repeatedly 
formulated  by  scholars  and  politicians  alike.  The 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
of the European Parliament, for instance, demanded a 
review of counterterrorism policies based on criteria 
such as effectiveness and proportionality in July 2011. 
Recently, interest and research effort in the area has 
increased, as illustrated by a limited number of works 
dealing  specifically  with  counterterrorism 
effectiveness  and  the  launch  of  a  number  of  new 
research projects. 
Further,  within  the  EUSECON  project  a  number  of 
studies  explicitly  deal  with  the  effects  of  certain 
policies, including counterterrorist financing (Brzoska, 
2011)  and  the  use  of  CCTV  referred  (Stutzer  and 
Zehnder, 2010).  
Is counterterrorism effective? 
Answering this type of question proves to be rather 
difficult, given the heterogeneous research landscape 
in the area. Not only does one find a plurality of CT 
measures  and  countries  studied  and  methods  used, 
but also of definitions as to what effectiveness means. 
For some authors, enacting policy measures to address 
the problem suffices. While for others the indicators of 
success  include  outcomes  such  as  the  numbers  of 
terrorists  arrested  or  killed,  or,  indeed,  the  actual 
decrease of terrorist activity.  Even here, however, we 
run  into  the  difficulty  of  deciding,  for  instance, 
whether  the  number  of  terrorist  attacks  or  their 
intensity is of relevance. 
Having  an  overarching  framework 
for  counterterrorism  effectiveness 
would  benefit  the  field,  not  only 
conceptually,  but  also  in  order  to 
address  and  clarify  some  of  the 
issues mentioned above, such as, what do we actually 
want  to  achieve  and  how  do  we  assess  that?  In  a 
recent  contribution  (Van  Um  and  Pisoiu,  2011),  we 
adapt  the  effectiveness  conceptualisation  initially 
developed  in  policy  cycle  analysis  and  which 
distinguishes between output, outcome and impact of 
a policy.  
Within this framework, output effectiveness refers to 
the implementation of regulations, policy instruments 
or compliance mechanisms. Outcome effectiveness, in 
contrast, particularly covers the direct and measurable 
effect  that  these  laws  have  in  real  life.  Impact 
effectiveness depends on the behaviour of the targeted 
audience in relation to the long-term objective of the 
CT  policy,  namely  that  of  reducing  or  stopping 
terrorism.  
This concept of effectiveness does not account for the 
costs related to policy measures, however; for that a 
concept of efficiency would be needed. Unfortunately, 
this is not really covered in academic research. One of 
the  few  existing  studies  (Sandler  et  al.,  2011) 
evaluates the efficiency of INTERPOL work, based on 
its cost and benefit (prevented attacks). 
The causality question  
Whether  or  not  certain  measures  indeed  cause  a 
decrease or even cessation of terrorist activity – the 
core  of  our  question  –  is  an  issue  that 
counterterrorism  effectiveness  research  can  only 
address  with  a  limited  amount  of  certainty.  This  is 
because the research methods used can only establish 
correlation. This basically means that doubts remain 
whether the relationship between policy and effect are 
causal  or  not.  In  most  cases,  the  effect  of  a  policy 
measure remains probabilistic, since the real reason 
for  an  observed  effect  may  be  a  number  of  other 
factors and not the actual counterterrorism measure. 
For instance, a reduction in terrorism may be due to 
terror  groups’  strategic  thinking  to 
reallocate  resources  for  the 
preparation  of  a  more  elaborated 
attack; or to internal rivalry within a 
terror group. 
This  brings  us  to  the  core  issue  of  CT  effectiveness 
research,  namely  the  need  for  causal  models  that 
would support the correlations found in studies. For 
instance,  establishing  a  causal  relationship  between 
development aid and a reduction of terrorist incidents 
would  only  be  convincing  if  economic 
underdevelopment had previously been established as 
a  root  cause  of  terrorist  violence.  However,  this 








Metal detectors  Targeted 
assassinations 
Curfew and search 
operations 
Military tribunals  The use of security/ 
military force 
Emergency powers  Wiretapping  Torture 
EU/International 
cooperation 
Military air strikes  Racial profiling 
Fortification  Preemptive arrests  Unilateral/multilateral 
economic sanctions 
Table 1. Examples of evaluated CT measures 
There is no universal recipe for counterterrorism  
Similarly, as Brzoska (2011) concludes, the causal link 
between  financing  and  the  number  or  intensity  of 
terrorist attacks on which policies of counterterrorist 
financing rest, lacks empirical validity. 
Another  aspect  affecting  the  question  of  “what  is 
effective  in  counterterrorism”  is  the  variety  of 
indicators  used.  These  include  output-related 
indicators  such  as  levels  of  international  or  EU 
cooperation. Other authors have referred to indicators 
related  to  outcome-effectiveness  (for  instance,  the 
number  of  arrested  or  killed  suspected  terrorists, 
freezing of assets, seizing of weapons). Indicators of 
impact-effectiveness mostly deal with the number of 
terrorist  attacks  carried  out  or  prevented.  A 
commonly encountered fallacy, particularly in policy, 
is  impact  evaluation  using  outcome  indicators.  For 
instance,  the  killing  of  suspected  terrorists  as  an 
outcome  of  a  specific  policy  may  not  reduce  future 
terrorism but spark recruitment, leading to growing 
numbers of militants and ultimately even increasing 
the number of attacks. 
Having  said  that,  even  using  appropriate  indicators 
will not guarantee accurate evaluation. This is because 
one  and  the  same  aspect  may  be  considered  as 
indicator for the effectiveness of a measure, or rather 
as  side-effect  thereof.  An  example  for  that  is  the 
negative  effect  of  certain  CT  measures  on  human 
rights.  This  might  be  considered  merely  as  an 
unpleasant  consequence  affecting  the  state’s 
reputation and moral credibility, or indeed as actual 
indicators of effectiveness through the intermediary of 
increased recruitment. Similarly, if negative economic 
consequences of CT measures are only considered as a 
side-aspect  in  determining  effectiveness,  harsh 
measures  that  help  arrest  potential  terrorists,  but 
impose  a  heavy  economic  burden,  might  still  be 
considered  effective.  If,  in  contrast,  the  economic 
impact of CT measures is considered to be central to 
the  evaluation  of  effectiveness,  the  same  measures 
might be evaluated more critically. For instance, in the 
aftermath  of  major  terrorist  attacks,  the  transport 
sector had to bear additional costs created by newly 
implemented security standards. This means that the 
economic effects of CT measures may even be greater 
than the initial costs of a terrorist attack (Schneider et 
al., 2011). 
What works? 
In our recent contribution (Van Um and Pisoiu, 2011), 
we analyse the academic literature that explicitly or 
implicitly  evaluates  counterterrorism  measures. 
Researchers  have  tested  the 
effects  of  a  variety  of 
counterterrorism  measures, 
examples of which are listed in table 1 and some of 
which  attract  moral  or  legal  objections,  and  the 
answer to the question of what works, is: it depends. 
As desirable and practical as it might seem, identifying 
one  or  a  range  of measures  that  are  effective  in  all 
countries and at all points in time is a rather hopeless 
undertaking. This is because effectiveness usually also 
depends on other circumstances, not least the cultural 
and  historical  context  or  the  type  of 
terrorist group targeted. That said, there 
are a few types of measures where most 
scholars  agree  on  their  lack  of 
effectiveness,  and  these  are  usually  the 
ones  that  entail  human  rights 
infringements: aggressive tactics, invasive 
techniques, as well as the use of force or 
torture. 
Policy recommendations 
Three  policy  recommendations  follow 
from these findings. Given the contextual 4 | EUSECON POLICY BRIEFING 13 DECEMBER 2011  
 
variation, a measure that has proven effective in one 
country  might  not  work  in  another.  The  first 
recommendation is therefore to be reluctant to imitate 
without  scrutiny  of  the  local  setting.  The  second  is 
related  to  the  type  of  policy  implemented.  The 
majority of studies have focused on a relatively limited 
number of measures and particularly offensive ones, 
such  as  military  air  strikes  and  targeted 
assassinations.  These  are  most  often  found  to  be 
ineffective  and  actually encourage  further  terrorism, 
all the more so when used indiscriminately. We would 
therefore suggest refraining from the use of aggressive 
measures.  Better  success  rates  seem  to  be  obtained 
through police work, which has, in fact, traditionally 
been pursued in European CT policy. Finally, the large 
number of studies evaluating offensive policies is not 
matched by research on protective ones. Clearly, more 
funding  is  needed  to  evaluate  such  measures, 
especially  since  they  in  fact  constitute  the  most 
important part of the European CT arsenal. 
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